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I.

INTRODUCTION

Alex is an eleven-year-old student with Asperger's
Disorder, a mild form of autism that impairs his social-emotional
development, verbal processing, and fine motor skills.' He has
T Law Clerk, Sr. Judge Emmett Ripley Cox, United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit; J.D., summa cum laude, 2009, University of Georgia
School of Law; M.Ed., 2005, Kennesaw State University; B.S. Ed., 2000,
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania.
1See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF THE

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (4th ed. 2000). "Motor delays or motor
clumsiness may be noted in the preschool period. Difficulties in social
interaction may become more apparent in the context of school [when]

particular idiosyncratic or circumscribed interests . . .may appear .... As
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successfully completed fifth grade at a public elementary school
and is excited to transition to the middle school for sixth grade. His
learning disabilities, eccentric behavior, and inability to empathize
impact his ability to function in a typical school setting. He is
prone to fixating on topics unrelated to school, and he engages in
behaviors that are not age-appropriate, making it difficult for him
to complete academic tasks without regular adult support and
supervision. However, Alex is very bright and can complete gradeappropriate assignments when he works in a controlled environment with dedicated, talented teachers.2
Had Alex been of school age prior to the 1970s, it is
possible he would have never set foot in a classroom, as children
with disabilities were systematically denied access to public
schools. 3 Alex may not have had the opportunity to learn, thrive or
become an independent adult. Today, however, Alex and millions
of other disabled students are served in America's public schools
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act4 (IDEA).
IDEA guarantees Alex and all disabled students a Free Appropriate
Public Education (FAPE).5
IDEA requires that Alex be served under an Individualized
Education Program (IEP) - a written, individualized curriculum
that includes statements of his present levels of performance,
special education and related services, annual goals, and suppleadults, individuals with the condition may have problems with empathy and
modulation of social interaction." Id.
2 Alex and disabled students like him are often served in general education
classrooms. Roughly 54% of special education students receive at least 80% of

instruction in the general education setting. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics,
Fast Facts, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id-59 (last visited May 10,

2010).

3 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 462-63

(1985) (Marshal J., concurring) ("[R]etarded children were categorically
excluded from public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were
ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded children from
them... Society portray[ed] the 'feeble-minded' as a 'menace to society...
responsible ... for many, if not all, of our social problems.").

4 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
5 Id. §§ 1401(9), 1412.
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mentary aids that assist him in attaining his annual goals. 6 IEPs are
highly individualized, detailed documents. Alex's IEP, if written
well, would guide his teachers and support staff in planning most
aspects of his school day.7 A team consisting of Alex's parents, a
general education teacher, a special education teacher, and a school
psychologist meet at least once per year to develop an IEP. 8 The
team met this spring at Alex's elementary school, to plan his
transition to the middle school.
Due to Alex's fixations and inappropriate social behaviors,
he needs regular one-on-one support, and his fine motor deficits
prevent him from writing legibly. He must use a computer or word
processor for all written assignments. While it would be most
convenient for the school to offer these supports and services in a
self-contained, small group setting, Alex's IEP team has agreed
that because he is capable of completing grade-level work, he
would best be served in a general education setting. 9 To better
support him in the mainstreamed classroom and with the transition
to middle school, Alex's IEP team agreed to provide one-on-one
assistance from a paraprofessional in all classes and access to a
portable word processor, so he could type his assignments. The
team was confident that given these services, Alex could succeed
in attaining his goals and objectives without needing a restrictive,
self-contained classroom. However, without these supports and
accommodations, the team felt Alex would require a much more
6 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).

7 Most disputes over the adequacy of special education services will center on
whether an IEP is appropriate for the student. See PAM WRIGHT & PETE
WRIGHT, FROM EMOTIONS TO ADVOCACY: THE SPECIAL EDUCATION SURVIVAL

GUIDE 115-31 (2d ed. 2006) (advocating SMART IEPs that are "specific,
measurable, use action words, are realistic and relevant, and time-limited.").
8 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B) (2006) (defining IEP team).
9 IDEA requires that schools serve students in the least restrictive environment
(LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). "To the maximum extent appropriate,
children with disabilities . . . are [to be] educated with children who are not

disabled .... " Id. The LRE for Alex is an inclusive classroom in light of
IDEA's "strong [congressional] preference in favor of mainstreaming." E.g.,
Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (6th Cir. 1983).

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXVIII

restrictive environment. While Alex's parents were concerned
about their son's ability to function in the middle school, they left
the IEP meeting optimistic, feeling that the supports offered in the
IEP would ensure Alex could receive an appropriate education the
following school year.
Alex's fifth grade teachers took the lead role in developing
the IEP. They considered the supports and services that most
benefitted Alex in the elementary school, primarily the one-on-one
aide and word processor, and assumed those same resources were
available in the middle school. The middle school, however, does
not usually mainstream disabled students into the general
education setting. Instead, it places students who need significant
supports in self-contained classes, where they receive remedial
instruction. 10 Consequently, the middle school does not employ
one-on-one aides or offer students personal portable word
processors. When Alex arrived for his first day of school, his
middle school teachers could not adequately implement the IEP. 11
They were faced with the choice of either placing Alex in the
general education setting unsupported, where he would be
overwhelmed, or placing him in the self-contained class, where he
could work on individualized, grade level assignments and have
access to a personal computer on which to complete his work.
The middle school chose to place Alex in a self-contained
classroom; the principal promised Alex's parents he would
immediately attempt to hire a one-on-one aide and purchase the
necessary equipment to support Alex in the general education
classroom. However, two months have passed, and the school has
yet to locate a qualified one-on-one aide. Alex is still in the self10While IDEA includes a preference for mainstreaming special education
students and mandates they be served in the least restrictive environment, many
schools serve special education students largely in self-contained settings. See
generally Kenneth A. Kavale & Steven R. Forness, History, Rhetoric, and
Reality: Analysis of the Inclusion Debate, 21 REM. & SPECIAL EDUC. 279, n.5
(2000) (examining history of inclusion debate).
" Often, middle schools send representatives to elementary school IEP meetings
to ensure the IEP better reflects the resources available at the middle school. See
20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B) (2006) (defining IEP team).
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contained classroom, and complains often that his assignments are
too basic. While his recent standardized test scores show he is
performing above grade level and making progress on his IEP
goals and objectives, Alex's parents are not satisfied. They would
never have enrolled Alex in the public middle school had they
known he would not receive the services set forth in the IEP in the
general education setting. They feel the middle school has denied
Alex a FAPE.
IDEA provides that students may pursue relief for denial of
a FAPE through a due process hearing, 12 and after exhausting
administrative remedies, through a civil action in state or federal
court. 13 The hearing officer or district court is authorized to grant
"appropriate relief' 14 and can award attorneys fees to parents who
are prevailing parties.' 5 Most commonly, parents seek equitable
remedies, such as specific school placements, specialized services,
private school tuition,' 6 and compensatory education.1 7 In Alex's
case, his parents would likely seek an injunction forcing the school
to implement his IEP and compensatory education for the two
18
months he has been placed in the self-contained classroom.
Unfortunately for Alex, however, under certain interpretations of

1220 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (providing procedural safeguards).
" Id. § 1415(i)(2) ("any party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... shall

have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented
pursuant to this section.").
14Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii).

15 Id. § 1415(i)(3).
16See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359
(1985) (establishing right to tuition reimbursement after parent's unilateral
placement in private school).
17See, e.g., Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872-73 (3d

Cir. 1990) (concluding compensatory education practically indistinguishable

from tuition reimbursement).
18

While unlikely in this case, some courts have awarded tort-like damages

through IDEA based § 1983 claims. See Terry J. Seligman, A Diller,A Dollar:
Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REV.
465, 497 (2002) (noting damages available in Third, Second, and Ninth
Circuits).
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IDEA, the school will be found to have offered a FAPE even
though it did not fully implement his IEP.
IDEA has generated considerable litigation over what
constitutes a FAPE. 19 Disputes over the adequacy of an IEP are
relatively common; parents and schools often disagree over which
services and supports are necessary for a disabled student to
receive an "appropriate" education.
Alex's case, however,
presents a different sort of conflict, since the parents and the school
were able to reach an agreement over the contents of the IEP.
Instead, Alex's case involves a dispute over implementation of the
IEP. Alex's school has failed to implement his IEP in a timely
manner, and his parents allege that this has denied him a FAPE.
Few courts have addressed this issue. Some have applied a
"materiality standard," under which a school is found to offer a
FAPE even when it fails to implement portions of an IEP as long
as those provisions are not deemed substantial, and the student
otherwise makes progress on his annual goals.2 1 Because Alex
progressed on his goals and objectives, and he has completed
assignments in the small group classroom similar to those he
would receive in the general education setting, the school may be
found to have offered a FAPE.
This article contends the materiality standard, while a
permissible interpretation of IDEA, is inconsistent with the
purpose of the Act to ensure students with disabilities receive a
meaningful educational benefit. Instead, this article suggests that
courts adopt a per se approach to implementation cases. Whenever
a school agrees in an IEP to provide certain services or supports
the law should require it fully implement those services.

'9See, e.g., Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under IDEA, 37
J.L. & EDuc. 367, 377-78 (2008) (describing FAPE standard).
20 See infra Part II.B (describing Rowley standard).
21 See id. (describing materiality standard).
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BACKGROUND
A. Defining Free Appropriate Public Education:
The "Some Benefit" standard and the
"Meaningful Benefit" standard

The

Education

for All

Handicapped

Children's

Act

(EAHCA) of 197522 opened the doors of public schools to students
with disabilities. Prior to the Act's passage, more than one-half of
the children with disabilities in the United States did not receive
appropriate educational services. 2 3 Today, over six-million
students with disabilities are served under the Act in public
schools. 24 Through EAHCA, Congress not only offered children
with disabilities access to public education, but also guaranteed
them a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 25 While EAHCA
has been amended and reauthorized a number of times, 26 and is
now known as IDEA, 27 its original promise remains its purpose
today, to ensure every student with a disability receives a FAPE. 28
22 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§
1400-1482 (2006)).
23 Prior to EAHCA, the right to public education for students with disabilities
was recognized by some courts on equal protection and due process grounds.
See Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (finding state was required to afford disabled children a public education);
Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C.D.C 1972) (finding total exclusion
of disadvantaged children from public education violated due process clause).
24 See NAT'L CENT. LEARNING DISABILITIES, IDEA PARENT GUIDE (2006),

available at http://www.ncld.org/images/stories/Publications/AdvocacyBriefs/
/idea2004ParentGuide/ldea2004ParentGuide.pdf.
25 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
26 See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (two recent

amendments).

27 While the Act is commonly known as IDEA, some commentators refer to it as
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEIA), a

reference to the 2004 amendments. See, e.g., Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill
Meinhardt, Commentary, Valuing the Education of Students with Disabilities:
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IDEA does not clearly articulate standards for FAPE; it
defines FAPE as "special education and related services that have
been provided at public expense .. meet the standards of the state
educational agency . . include an appropriate preschool,
elementary school, or secondary school education . . . and are
provided in conformity with [an] individualized education program
.. ,,29 The Act does not clarify the meaning of "appropriate,"
instead leaving to courts the task of developing standards for
interpreting the meaning of FAPE.3 ° Consequently, there has been
"an extraordinary amount of litigation" 3 1 regarding FAPE, framed
largely by the Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Education
of
32
Rowley.
v.
District
School
Central
Hudson
Hendrick
the
In Rowley, a hearing-impaired student claimed a school
33
denied a FAPE by failing to provide a sign-language interpreter.
The Rowley decision came early in the life of IDEA, seven years
after Congress first enacted the law to "open the schoolhouse
doors" to students with disabilities. 34 The Court held the school
district was not required to provide an interpreter, rejecting the
district court's reasoning that as part of a FAPE, the student was
entitled to "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other [non-

Has Government Legislation Caused a Reinterpretationof a Free Appropriate
Public Education?,222 ED. L. REP. 515 (2007) (referring to the Act as IDEIA).
28 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) (stating purpose is "to ensure that all

children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education ... designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further
educational, employment, and independent living .....

Id. § 1401(9) (emphasis added).
30 See infra Part II.B. (describing standards for FAPE).
29

31See Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 27, at 517.
32 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
33Id. at 176.
34 See Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special
Education Law, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 561, 563-64 (2003) (describing
background of Rowley decision and Congressional intent of original Act).
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disabled] children." 35 The opinion reflects the original intent of the
Act, not to ensure an optimal education,
but to ensure disabled
36
schools.
public
to
access
have
students
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rowley begins by
noting that the Act failed to clarify "appropriate education" and left
to the courts the responsibility of "giving content" to the requirement. 37 The opinion "gave content" by establishing a "minimalist" 38 definition of FAPE: "implicit in the congressional
purpose of providing access to a 'free and appropriate public
education' is the requirement that the education to which access is
provided be sufficient to confer some educationalbenefit upon the
handicapped child.",39 The Court went on to describe FAPE in
terms of access to basic services by explaining "the 'basic floor of
opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to
provide educational benefit to the handicapped child., 40 The
opinion stressed the importance of complying with procedural
requirements of the act,4 1 establishing a two-step test to analyze
FAPE claims:
Therefore, a court's inquiry in suits brought under 1415(e)
(2) is twofold. First, has the state complied with the
procedure set forth in the Act? And second, is the
3 Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp.
528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 632 F. 2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458

U.S. 176 (1982).
36 See Johnson, supra note 34, at 563 (noting Congress sought to make public
education available to handicapped children).
37 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.

See Lester Aaron, Too Much or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts
Defined a Free Appropriate Public Education After Rowley, 39 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2005) (analyzing the Rowley definition of FAPE).
39 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 206 (stating that congressional emphasis upon full participation of
38

concerned parties demonstrates that adequate compliance with procedures would
in most cases assure what Congress wished in way of substantive content in an
IEP).
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individualized educational program developed through the
Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are
met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed
by Congress and the courts can require no more.42
This limiting definition of FAPE appears to protect schools
from most substantive claims unless a student's educational
program is not reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
any educational benefit.43 Some courts have adhered to this
definition, dismissing most claims of denial of a FAPE as long as
schools provide an IEP containing some version of the enumerated
requirements listed in IDEA.44 For example, the First Circuit, in
L. T TB. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick School Committee,4 5 considered
whether a school offered a FAPE to an autistic child through the
school's curriculum or whether the law required an alternative
autism curriculum preferred by the parents. 4 6 Finding for the
school district, the court held that the program offered by the
school was adequate. 4 7 Because the school's program offered some
educational benefit, the court refused to address the parents' claim
that their preferred curriculum would better serve the needs of the
child, explaining "[o]nce the determination is made that the IEP
was adequate, that ends the inquiry. We need not consider whether
other programs would be better., 48 Similarly, in O'Toole ex rel.
Id. at 206-07.
41Id. at 207.
44 See, e.g., Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. v. Koupal, 526 N.W.2d 248, 252 (S.D. 1994)
(holding teacher training not a related service required in IEP); Alex R. ex rel.
Beth R. v. Forestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir.
2004) (denying claim based on defects in behavioral intervention plan (BIP)
because IDEA lists only procedural, not substantive BIP requirements).
4'361 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2004).
46 Id. at 86. The school offered the multi-modality approach of Treatment and
Education of Autistic and Related Communication-Handicapped Children
(TEACHH).
The parents advocated Discreet Trial Training (DTT). Id.
4
42

7

[d.
48 [d.
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O 'Toole v. Olathe DistrictSchools Unified School DistrictNumber
233, the Tenth Circuit considered whether a school denied FAPE
after a hearing impaired child failed to make adequate progress on
academic goals in the IEP. 49 The court held for the school,
reasoning that IDEA does not require the best possible education
for a student, nor require that IEPs be designed for the child to
achieve optimal results. 50 The court held the "IEP, even if not
optimal, was calculated to, and did, confer educational benefits as
required by the IDEA., 5 1 This strict interpretation of Rowley,
applied in L. T TB. and O 'Toole, is often referred to as the "some
or adequate benefit" test; it has been adopted in the First, Eighth,
Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits. 52 Other circuits, however, apply
a more flexible interpretation of Rowley, more favorable to
students alleging a denial of a FAPE.
While Rowley appears to tilt the scales in favor of schools
with respect to denial of FAPE claims, some courts have
developed a broader definition of FAPE, which calls for greater
educational benefits. 53 In many cases, schools have been found to
have denied a FAPE even though they provided an IEP that
conveyed educational benefit. 54 The "some educational benefit"
49 144 F.3d 692, 708 (10th Cir. 1998).
50 id.
51id.
52 Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 27, at 519 (summarizing interpretations of

FAPE since the Rowley decision).
53See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir.
1999) (stating IEP must provide "meaningful benefit"); Deal v. Hamilton
County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The IDEA requires

an IEP to confer a 'meaningful educational benefit'... gauged in relation to the
potential of the child at issue."). See generally Aaron, supra note 38, at 7.
(analyzing circuit split between "meaningful benefit" and "some benefit"
standards).
54 See, e.g., Scorah v. Dist. of Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 2d 12, 20 (D.D.C. 2004)

(holding student who transferred from public special education program to
private school and showed marked improvement was denied FAPE in public
school); Fisher v. Bd. of Educ. Christina Sch. Dist., 856 A.2d 552, 559 (Del.
2004) (finding student who made progress under IEP in early grades but later
regressed was denied FAPE); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v.Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966,
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standard has broadened in many jurisdictions to a "meaningful
benefit" standard, under which FAPE requires "significant learning" and calls for "more than trivial educational benefit. '55 For
example, the Sixth Circuit in Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County
Board of Education considered, like the First Circuit in L. T TB.,
56
differing opinions regarding an appropriate autism curriculum.
The school offered its "standard 'eclectic' program for teaching
autistic children," while the parents preferred an applied behavior
analysis approach.57 Unlike the First Circuit, however, the Sixth
Circuit did not solely measure the adequacy of the program offered
by the school, and reasoned "there is a point at which the
difference in outcomes between two methods can be so great that
provision of the lesser program could amount to a denial of a
FAPE.,, 58 The court concluded it would be insufficient to require a
school to provide educational services that offer little more than de
minimis educational benefit. 59 Instead, it explained "IDEA requires
an IEP to confer a meaningful educational benefit gauged in
relation to the child at issue." 60 This "meaningful benefit test" has
been adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits.61
This shift away from Rowley's minimalist interpretation of
FAPE may, in part, reflect evolving views of special education and
the purpose of IDEA. Rowley interpreted a statute passed when
over four-million children with disabilities in the United States did
978 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding district denied FAPE by placing autistic student in
a setting with children with many different types of disabilities).
55 Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247.

56 See 392 F.3d 840, 845 (6th Cir. 2004).
57 Id. at 845-47.
58 Id. at 862.
59 Id. at 861 (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1341 (6th Cir.

1989).
Id. at 862. The court reversed the district court's judgment for school and
remanded the case to allow the court to determine whether the IEP offered a
meaningful educational benefit. Id. at 865.
60

61 See

Daniel

& Meinhardt,

supra note 27,
interpretations of FAPE since the Rowley decision).

at 518-20

(summarizing
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not receive appropriate educational services, 62 and one-million
were excluded entirely from the public school system.6 3 Within
this context, the Court interpreted FAPE in terms of access to
educational opportunity. 64 Thanks in part to the success of IDEA,
however, disabled students no longer face barriers to accessing
public schools.65 The modern focus of IDEA has
become the
66
adequacy of the education provided under the Act.
Congress has not altered the statutory definition of FAPE
since 1975. 67 Over time though, old words gain new meaning, and
what Congress means by FAPE today encompasses more than
mere access to the public schools. 68 Through amendments to IDEA
62 Act to Amend the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, §
3(1), (3), 89 Stat. 774, 780 (1975).
63 Id. § 3(4). Prior to court action in the 1970s and the passage of IDEA, severely
disabled students were often barred from public education. See Pa. Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 312-13 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(holding law excluding "uneducable children" from public education violated
Due Process).
64 See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 198-99 (1982) ("[F]urnishing of every special service necessary to
maximize each handicapped child's potential [would go] further than Congress
intended.").
65 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2-3) (2006) (describing increased access to education); see also Id. § 1400(c)(10-12) (describing over-identification of minorities
as disabled).
66 See, e.g., Andrea Blau, The IDEIA and the Right to
an "Appropriate"
Education, 2007 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (describing progression of
legislative intent from increasing physical access to ensuring cognitive access to
general education).
6' During the 2004 IDEA reauthorization process, Congresswoman Susan Davis
proposed broadening the definition of FAPE by adding "the language contained
in the Supreme Court Decision known as Rowley, which states that the goal for a
child with disabilities is the same as for all other children-to have the
educational and related services necessary for that child to access the general
curriculum." H.R. REP. No. 79- 108, at 3 (2003) (summarizing amendments).
68 Legislative history of the original statute focuses on the large numbers of
children not receiving special education services. See H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at
11-12 (1975) (noting 1,750,000 students receive no public schooling).
Legislative history of reauthorizations focus on adequacy of services and higher
expectations. See H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 85 (1997) (describing authorization
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over the past quarter-century, Congress has raised the "floor of
opportunity" to ensure high expectations for educational achievement, participation in the general curriculum and preparation for
independent living in adulthood.69 IDEA amendments in 1997
imposed new procedural requirements on schools v° that in effect
7
increase students' substantive rights to an adequate education. '
IDEA now calls for IEPs to include thorough descriptions of a
student's social and academic functioning, lists of necessary
supports to increase access to general education, and detailed plans
for improving academic, social and behavioral functioning. 72 Some
courts find that these new requirements conflict with a minimal
FAPE standard because providing only some educational benefit
could never permit children to attain Congress's broadened goals
for IDEA.73 Congress reauthorized IDEA again in 2004, expanding
as opportunity to "review, strengthen, and improve IDEA to better educate
children with disabilities and enable them to achieve a quality education").
69 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(5) (2006) ("Almost 30 years of research and experience
has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made
more effective by having high expectations, ... in order to meet developmental
goals ... and be prepared to lead productive and independent adult lives .... ").
70 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-17, § 614, 111 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 14001482 (2006)) (requiring IEPs to provide statements of classroom modifications
and "measurable annual goals" sufficient to allow a child to "advance
proportionately" toward progress in the general curriculum).
71 See Tara L. Eyer, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments
Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunityfor Children With Disabilities, 103 DICK.
L. REv. 613, 631 (1999) ("Because the definition of FAPE is primarily
procedural, the most facile and effective method to raise the level of substantive
rights under the IDEA is to heighten its procedural requirements.").
72 See generally Randy Chapman, Using the JEP to Get AppropriateServicesfor
Students with Disabilities,31 COLO. LAW. 29 (2002) (describing IEP procedural
requirements).
7, See Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864 (6th Cir. 2004)
("Indeed, states providing no more than some educational benefit could not
possibly hope to attain the lofty goals proclaimed by Congress."). But see Lt.
T.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 83 (lst Cir. 2004) ("We
do not interpret this statutory language, which simply articulates the importance
of teacher training, as overruling Rowley.").
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on some of the 1997 requirements but also amending IEP
requirements to focus on substantive outcomes. 74 As the scope of
IDEA has expanded, funding has also increased substantially from
two hundred million dollars per year in 197575 to over twenty-six
billion dollars per year projected for 2011,76 demonstrating commitment to improving special education and related services under
IDEA.
By increasing funding and imposing new IEP requirements,
Congress may have expanded the scope of IDEA and asked
schools to improve education for disabled students. 77 It clarified
the definition of free and appropriate public education by expanding the meaning of "appropriate." 78 It should no longer be viewed
as a program that "opens the door of public education, ' ,79 but it
now offers a meaningful education once inside. 8° Thus, the
74 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub.
L.

No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 14 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1484
(2006)); see also Andrea Valentino, The Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation
Improvement Act: Changing What Constitutes an "Appropriate" Education, 20
J.L. & HEALTH 139, 162-63 (2007) (describing congressional intent of 2004
IDEA amendments).
75 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, §
2(e), 89 Stat. 773.
76 20 U.S.C. § 1411(i)(7) (2006).
77 See H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 85 (1997), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname 105_cong reports&docid f:hr095.105.pdf
("Through this legislation the Committee intends to encourage exemplary
practices that lead to improved teaching and learning experiences for children
with disabilities [that] result in productive independent lives, including
employment.").
78 See generally Eyer, supra note 71, at 63 1 ("Almost every new requirement for
the IEP statement is a manifestation of Congress' stated purpose of achieving
greater expectations and educational outcomes for eligible children.").
79 See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 199-200 (1982).
80 The 2004 amendments of IDEA may affect the interpretation of FAPE. See
Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REv. 7, 16 (2006) (describing 2004 amendments).
See also Blau, supra note 66, at 6 (claiming coordination of No Child Left
Behind requirements into IDEA raises threshold of educational accountability).
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"meaningful benefit standard," applied by a slight majority of the
courts of appeals, is considered by many commentators to better
reflect the current purpose of IDEA. 81
B. IEP Implementation
To comply with IDEA, schools must satisfy the procedural
requirements of the Act and provide an appropriate education "in
conformity with" an IEP. 82 IDEA has generated much litigation
over the contents of IEPs; cases have measured the adequacy of
IEPs, analyzing whether they offered FAPE under the "some
benefit" or "meaningful benefit" standards. 83 Schools, though,
must also implement those IEPs, and IDEA does not include an
implementation standard. It leaves open the question: must schools
strictly comply with the terms of an IEP, providing each accommodation and service set forth in the plan, or do schools have the
freedom to deviate from the IEP, and still be found to offer a FAPE
despite a non-material implementation failure as long as the
student generally receives an "appropriate" education? If so, is a
showing of "some educational progress," or "meaningful educational progress" sufficient to excuse a failure to implement an IEP?
Little case law exists on this issue; most substantive 84 IDEA claims
involve challenges to the contents of an IEP.85 In few cases has a
81See Eyer, supra note 71, at 633-37 (calling for re-examination of Rowley after

1997 IDEA amendments); Valentino, supra note 74, at 167 ("The amendments
...exhibit intent to implement a heightened substantive meaning of the word
'appropriate."'); see also Blau supra note 66, at 18 (advocating a Department of
Education Regulation to clarify the standard for FAPE).
82 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
83 See generally Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Services that
Must be Provided by Federally Assisted Schools Under the Individuals with
DisabilitiesEducation Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.), 161 A.L.R.
FED. 1 (2000).
84 IDEA includes procedural provisions, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006), and the

substantive FAPE requirement. This analysis considers substantive issues, the
adequacy of an IEP and its implementation.
85 See, e.g., Stephen Lease et al., Annotation, 68 AM. JUR. 2D Schools § 347
(2008) (summarizing cases).
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student conceded that an IEP was adequate but alleged that the
86
school denied a FAPE by failing to implement its provisions.
Some courts have considered this question and adopted a
materiality standard, finding that failures to implement an IEP only
deny FAPE if they are substantial or when they prevent the student
from receiving educational benefit. 87 This article argues that while
the materiality standard may be a permissible interpretation of
ambiguous language in IDEA 88, it is contrary to the purpose of
IDEA to provide disabled students with meaningful educational
benefit.
C. The Materiality standard
The Fifth Circuit first articulated a materiality standard in
Houston Independent School District v. Bobby R.. 89 The student in
Bobby R. was entitled to speech therapy under his IEP. 90 The
school, however, did not have a qualified speech therapist on staff
for one-half of one school year. 9 1 To compensate for the lost
therapy, the school provided twenty-five hours of compensatory
speech therapy during the following summer. 92 Also, the school
neglected to implement certain IEP modifications and services,
including highlighted texts, modified tests, taped lectures, and a
multisensory reading program. 93 A hearing officer found these
16 See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist., 502 F.3d 811, 818 (9th
Cir. 2007) (noting "[w]e have applied the Rowley framework in numerous cases
...[but] we have not previously considered challenges to the implementation-as
opposed to the content-of an IEP.") (internal citations omitted).
17 See Catalan ex rel. E.C. v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 75-76
(D.D.C. 2007) (applying materiality standard to find failure to implement speech
therapy IEP provisions did not deny FAPE).
88 See infra Part III (describing ambiguity in FAPE definition calling
for services
to be provided "in conformity with" an IEP).
'9200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000).
90 Id. at 344.
9'See id.
92 Id.

93Id. The school offered compensatory multisensory instruction, but the parents
refused to accept these services.
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failures constituted a denial of a FAPE, but a district court
reversed, finding that the student received a FAPE because "he had
shown improvement in most areas of study and therefore had
received an educational benefit in accordance with the goals of
IDEA. 94 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that "a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de
minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead
must demonstrate that the school .
failed to implement
substantial or significant provisions of the IEP. 95 The court
ultimately applied the Fifth Circuit version of the Rowley standard
to determine if the IEP "conveyed educational benefit." 96 It
emphasized the student's test scores and grade levels, finding that
because improvements were not "trivial," the district court did not
commit clear error in determining the student received educational
benefit from the IEP.9 v
The Eighth Circuit articulated a similar standard as the
Fifth in Neosho R-V School District v. Clark, in which an
implementation failure was deemed substantial so as to deny a
FAPE. 98 In Clark, the student's IEP called for a behavior plan, but
for almost an entire school year, the school did not develop and
implement such a plan. 99 Applying Rowley, the district court found
that because the student needed a behavior management plan and
because no plan was timely developed, the IEP was not reasonably
calculated to provide an educational benefit. 00 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, finding that the student only made slight academic
Id. at 345 (summarizing district court's reasoning).
9' Id. at 349. The court cited with approval Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725
F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989), which found a failure to provide all the services
and modifications outlined in an IEP does not constitute a per se violation of the
94

IDEA.
Id. (applying four-step test developed in Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Michael F., 118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997).
97 Id. at 349-50.
98315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003).
99
Id. at 1025.
96

100

Id. at 1026-27 (noting that the analysis set forth in Bobby R. more accurately

suits the posture of the case, but the parties did not make that argument).
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progress during the school year and the fact that "no cohesive plan
was in place to meet ... behavioral needs support[ed] the ultimate
conclusion that [the student] was not able to obtain a benefit from
his education."' '01 The Eighth Circuit applied a materiality analysis
like in Bobby R., but unlike the speech therapy and other services
at issue in Bobby R., the Eighth Circuit found that the failure to
implement the behavior management plan was a denial of an
"essential element of the IEP that was necessary for the child to
' 10 2
receive an educational benefit."
The Ninth Circuit adopted a materiality standard in Van
Duyn v. Baker School District 5J.10 3 In Van Duyn, an autistic
student alleged that the school failed to implement key portions of
his IEP, including provisions to train teachers, provide the required
placement in a self-contained classroom, provide direct teacher
engagement, address academic IEP goals, and follow a behavior
management plan. 104 An administrative law judge and district court
ruled that the school adequately implemented the IEP.1 05 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed; in doing so, it adopted a materiality standard,
reasoning:
[IDEA] counsels against making minor implementation
failures actionable given that "special education and related
services" need only be provided "in conformity with" the
IEP. There is no statutory requirement of perfect adherence
to the IEP, nor any reason rooted in the statutory text to
view minor implementation failures as denials of a free
appropriate public education. 106

101Id. at 1029.

Id. at 1027 n.3.
502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007).
104 Id. at 823.
105 Id. (noting AU ruled the school failed to provide sufficient Math instruction,
102
103

but
this was not an issue on appeal).
106
Id. at 821.
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The court cited Bobby R. 10 7 and Clark with approval and held that
"a material failure to implement an IEP violates the IDEA. A
material failure occurs when there is more than a minor
discrepancy between the services a school provides to a disabled
child and the services required by the child's IEP." 10 8 The court
went on to support its reasoning through an analogy to common
law principles, explaining "determining 'materiality' has been a
part of judging for centuries-for example, deciding whether a
contractual breach is material."' 1 9 It reasoned the materiality
standard does not require that the child suffer "demonstrable
educational harm" in order to prevail, but educational progress or
lack thereof is probative of whether there was a "significant
shortfall in services provided." 110 Applying this standard to the
case at hand, the court found none of the implementation failures at
issue were material because the discrepancies between services
provided and those called for in the IEP were minor, and the
child
11 '
goals.
behavioral
and
academic
on
progress
made sufficient
The Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all articulated
standards in which de minimis,112 minor discrepancies 113 between
the services provided and those listed in the IEP do not violate
IDEA. These courts rejected a per se approach, finding no conflict
107The Van Duyn Court noted it would "disagree with Bobby R. if it meant to

suggest that an educational benefit in one IEP area can offset an implementation

failure in another." Id. at 821 n.3. This cautionary language may suggest that the
Ninth Circuit would find a denial of FAPE even where a student gained

meaningful benefit from the IEP, as long as the failure to implement is deemed
material. In Bobby R., the Fifth Circuit found the IEP as implemented conferred
meaningful educational benefit. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200
F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2000). It is unclear whether this factor was determinative
or if the court would have found a denial of FAPE regardless of the benefit
conferred by the IEP had the failure to implement had been material.
108Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 822.

109
Id. at 823 n.4 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 241 (1981)).

0

l1 Id. at 823.

1 Id.at 825 (finding a failure to implement math instruction was remedied after
the AU's order).
112Bobby
113 Van

R., 200 F.3d at 349.
Duyn, 481 F.3d at 780.
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between the materiality standard and IDEA's requirement that
services to disabled children must be provided "in conformity
with" or "in accordance with" the IEP. 114 These courts favored an
approach to implementation cases that affords schools "flexibility
in implementing IEP's, but still holds [them] accountable for
material failures and for providing the disabled child a meaningful
educational benefit." 115 Nevertheless, there may be a significant
difference between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit approaches. In
Bobby R., the Fifth Circuit, after finding the plaintiff did not show
"more than a de minimis failure to implement," applied the general
Rowley analysis, suggesting that the ultimate question in implementation cases, like in all denial of FAPE cases, is whether the
IEP, as implemented, conveys educational benefit. 116 In contrast,
the Ninth Circuit, in Van Duyn, noted the "materiality standard
does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational
harm in order to prevail."' 7 While the Fifth Circuit standard
suggests a school offers a FAPE despite an implementation failure
as long as the implemented portions of the IEP convey educational
benefit, the Ninth Circuit appears to find a denial of FAPE
wherever the implementation failure in and of itself constitutes "a
significant shortfall in the services provided," even if the IEP, as
implemented, would otherwise meet the Rowley standard." 18
D. The Per Se approach
"How much of an IEP do you have to implement?" When
asked this question at an education conference, a few hundred
special education administrators answered with a resounding, "all

Id. at 780 n.4 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D); 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2)).
115
Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 349.
l6 Id at 350.
117Van Duyn, 481 F.3d at 822.
"1

118

Id.
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of it!" 119 They were surprised to learn that some courts have
applied a materiality standard; so too were special education
hearing officers. 120 A number of administrative decisions have
applied a per se rule to implementation challenges, under which a
failure to implement any portion of an IEP denies a FAPE. 12 1 In
addition, the Second Circuit has held that substantial compliance
cannot serve as a defense to a claim of denial of a FAPE, 122 and a
dissenting opinion in Van Duyn advocated for aper se approach. 123
A sampling of administrative decisions demonstrates that
in many cases where a school fails to provide a service called for
in an IEP, it has denied FAPE. For example, in cases where
schools failed to provide psychological services, 124 reading services, 125 and a climate controlled classroom, 126 as called for in
IEPs, the schools were found to have denied a FAPE. 127 These
hearing officers did not consider the extent of the implementation
failures or whether the IEPs, as implemented, conveyed educa119 Posting of Jim Gerl to Special Education Law Blog, http://specialeducation

lawblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/hot-button-issue-iep-implementation.html
8, 2008, 19:58 EST) (describing surprise over Van Duyn ruling).

120

See

Posting

of

Jim

Gerl

to

Special

Education

Law

(Oct.
Blog,

http://specialeducationlawblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/new-hot-button-issue-iepimplementation.html (Sept. 3, 2008, 18:20 EST) ("For the most part ... courts

and hearing officers have required full implementation.").
121
See infra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
122 D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 465 F.3d 503, 510-12 (2d Cir.
2006).
123 Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 828-29.

124 Roxanne J. v. Nev. County Human Servs. Agency, No. Civ S-05-2602, 2006
WL 3437494 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2006).
125Sanford Sch. Dep't. 47 IDELR (LRP) 176 (SEA Me. Oct. 31, 2006).
126 Guntersville City Bd. of Educ. 47 IDELR (LRP) 84 (SEA Ala. Aug. 18,
2006).

127At least one district court case gave lip service to the Bobby R. materiality
standard but found the services at issue "substantial and material" without
analysis. See Manalansan v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore, No. Civ. AMD 01-312,
2001 WL 939699, at * 11-12 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2001) (finding denial of FAPE
where school failed to provide an aide during all classroom activities as called
for in the IEP, and noting it is "hard to see how such services could be anything
but substantial and material.").
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tional benefit; they applied the generally accepted "rule"128that a
failure to implement any portion of an IEP denied a FAPE.
In D.D. ex rel. VD. v. New York City Board of
Education,12 9 the Second Circuit declined to apply a "substantial
compliance"' 130 standard in the context of a class action; its
reasoning appears to reject a materiality standard. In D.D., a class
of disabled preschool children assigned to a waiting list for special
education placements alleged the New York Board of Education
denied FAPE by failing to timely implement their IEPs. 13 1 They
moved for a preliminary injunction ordering immediate implementation of all services required by their IEPs. 132 A district court
denied the injunction, holding that the school district was in
"substantial compliance" with the provisions of IDEA because it
33
timely provided services to at least 97% of children with IEPs.
The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning "IDEA does not simply
require substantial compliance; ... it requires compliance."' 34 It
ultimately held IDEA required the school to 1implement
an IEP "as
35
soon as possible" after it has been developed.
128

See

Posting

of

Jim

Gerl

to

Special

Education

Law

Blog,

http://specialeducationlawblog.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-hot-button-issue-iepimplementation.html (Aug. 12, 2008, 19:18 EST) ("[T]he Van Duyn decision]
came as pretty big news to many of us... who thought that the 'rule' was that a
district pretty much had to implement all of an IEP.").
129 465 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 2006).
130

IDEA includes a substantial compliance provision authorizing the Secretary

of Education to withhold payments pursuant to the Act if the state has failed to
comply substantially with the provisions of the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(3)
(2006). The district court wrongly applied this standard to the individual denial
of FAPE claim at issue. D.D., 465 F.3d at 510.
131 D.D., 465 F.3d at 505-06. For example, the school district offered one student
an IEP in November of 2002, but had not provided any services under it by May
of 2003. Id. at 507.
132 Id. at 506.
"' Id. at 509-10.
134Id. at

512.

135Id. at 514 (relying on IDEA implementing regulation 34 C.F.R. §
300.342(b)(1)(ii) requiring an IEP be implemented as soon as possible after the
requisite IEP meetings).
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The most thorough argument for a per se approach to IEP
implementation failures is found in a dissenting opinion in Van
Duyn, the Ninth Circuit case discussed in part II.B. 136 The
dissenting judge argued:
an IEP is the product of an extensive process and represents
the reasoned conclusion of the IEP Team that the specific
measures it requires are necessary for the student to receive
a ... FAPE. A school district's failure to comply with the
specific measures in an IEP 13
to7 which it has assented is, by
definition, a denial of FAPE.
The dissent found the definition of FAPE, which calls for
services to be provided in conformity with the IEP, requires the
school to implement all portions of an IEP, not merely those
deemed material.1 38 It reasoned:
[j]udges are not in a position to determine which parts of
an agreed-upon IEP are or are not material. The IEP Team
. . . is the entity equipped to determine the needs of a
special education student, and the IEP represents this
determination. Although judicial review of the content of
an IEP is appropriate when the student ... challenge[s] the

sufficiency of the IEP, such review is not appropriate
where, as here, all parties
have agreed that the content of
39
FAPE.1
the IEP provides

136 Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 828-29

(9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson, J. dissenting). Curiously, the plaintiff-appellant

student did not argue the materiality standard was inconsistent with IDEA. Id. at
822 n.4 (noting "not even Van Duyn has advocated a per se rule like the
dissent's; indeed, at oral argument his counsel agreed that a standard akin to that
endorsed in Bobby R. would be satisfactory.").
137 Id. at 827.
1'

Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D)(2006)).

139 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The dissent argued the per se standard would not impose an
onerous burden on schools, noting the school is free to amend the
IEP through required channels if it finds that portions of the
program are not essential to providing a FAPE. 140 It reasoned,
however, that permitting the school district to disregard already
agreed-upon portions of the IEP would give the district freedom to
unilaterally amend the IEP by default. 141
As demonstrated by the numerous administrative decisions,
the Second Circuit's reasoning in D.D., and the dissent in Van
Duyn, the materiality standard is not universally accepted.1 42 IDEA
calls for services to be provided in conformity with an IEP; 143 this
can be read to require complete implementation of a student's IEP.
This article argues this per se approach is consistent with the
purpose of IDEA.
I1.

ANALYSIS

The few courts to have examined IEP implementation
144
issues have offered three possible standards. The Bobby R.
approach may not focus on the failure to implement itself; instead,
it likely examines the IEP, as implemented, and asks whether it
meets either the "some benefit" test or the "meaningful benefit"
test discussed in part II.A. The Van Duyn approach measures the
extent of the implementation failure. If it is deemed material, the
school will be found to have denied FAPE even if the IEP, as
implemented, meets the Rowley standard because the student
140

Id. at 828.

141 Id.
142

See, e.g.,

Elexis Reed, Case Note, The Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act The Ninth Circuit Determines that only a Material Failure to
Implement an IndividualizedEducation Program Violates the Individuals with
DisabilitiesEducation Act, 61 SMU L. REV. 495, 500 (2008) (following the
dissent in Van Duyn; arguing failure to implement any portion of an IEP violates
IDEA).
14' 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 115-18 (comparing the Fifth Circuit
approach in Bobby R. and the Ninth Circuit approach in Van Duyn).
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gained educational benefit from it. 145 The per se approach is most
friendly to students; it would find any failure to implement an IEP
146
a denial of a FAPE.
All three of these approaches appear to be permissible
interpretations of IDEA. The definition of FAPE is ambiguous; it
calls for FAPE to be provided "in conformity with" the IEP.14 7 It is
debatable whether this requires services be provided in perfect
conformity with the IEP, or whether it permits substantial
compliance. 14 8 Implementing regulations do not offer further
guidance. The only regulation on point requires schools to ensure
"special education and related services are made available to the
child "in accordance with the child's IEP;"' 14 9 this is also open to
interpretation. This article does not attempt to identify an
appropriate standard based on textual analysis or principles of
statutory construction. 15 Instead, it suggests that the per se
approach is consistent with the purpose of IDEA. Schools largely
control the contents of IEPs, and parents rely on schools to fulfill
promises they make during IEP meetings. Also, education hearing
officers' power to provide "appropriate" relief for denials of
FAPE 151 ensures schools will not be unduly burdened by the
imposition of a strict compliance standard.

145See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
147 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2006).
14' The majority and dissent in Van Duyn disagreed on this point; the majority
read the "in conformity" language as counseling "against making minor
implementation failures actionable" whereas the dissent found it called for strict
compliance. See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821, 827; see also Reed, supra note 142,

at 499 (comparing majority and dissent).
149 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2) (2007).
150This is not to suggest that courts should decline to consider issues of statutory
construction. It is not discussed here because this article concedes multiple
interpretations are reasonable.
151 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (2006).
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A. Schools' control over IEP contents

IDEA calls for IEPs to be developed by a team of parents
and educators. 52 In the vast majority of cases, however, teachers
and administrators have ultimate control over which educational
services, modifications and accommodations find their way in to
the IEP. 153 Prior to most meetings, a teacher writes a draft IEP,
which includes the special education and related services, accommodations, and modifications the teacher feels are appropriate for
the student. 54 The teacher has full knowledge of the services that
the school typically offers to disabled students and includes only
those services the school is capable and willing to provide., 55 At
the IEP meeting itself, parents occasionally request additional or
152

Id § 1414 (d)(1)(B) (defining IEP team).

"' See Philip T.K. Daniel, Education for Students with Special Needs: The
JudiciallyDefined Role of Parents in the Process, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 3 (2000)
(noting "school districts are still very much in control, since no part of the
special education process can move forward without the approval of school
officials.").
154 The U.S. Department of Education condones but does not recommend that
teachers write draft IEPs prior to meetings:
We do not encourage public agencies to prepare a draft IEP prior to the
IEP Team meeting, particularly if doing so would inhibit a full
discussion of the child's needs. However, if a public agency develops a
draft IEP prior to the IEP Team meeting, the agency should make it
clear to the parents at the outset of the meeting that the services
proposed by the agency are preliminary recommendations for review
and discussion with the parents.
34 C.F.R. § 300.322(b) (2006). "It is not permissible for an agency to have the
final IEP completed before an IEP Team meeting begins." Id.
155Many teachers utilize IEP software that allows them to choose from a list of
available services, accommodations, goals and objectives. Because these
programs encourage the IEP drafter to select from a menu of available services,
they reduce the amount of individualization and the probability that the teacher
will include IEP provisions the school is unable or unwilling to provide. See,
e.g., Glen Allen, Business Wire, Xperts Releases Version 5.0 of lEP Online;
First Fully Web-Based Individualized Education Plan Software for Public
School Systems in the United States (July 1, 2002), http://www.allbusiness.com/
company-activities-management/product-management/5901278-1 .html
(describing IEP software).
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different services from those included in the draft IEP, but those
services will only be included in the IEP if the school consents to
them. 156 The IEP development process, in most cases, involves a
teacher selecting from a menu of supports and services, and the
parents accepting the recommendations of the teacher. Given the
control the school exerts over the contents of an IEP,157 it is
reasonable to expect 158
the school to fulfill its promises by fully
IEP.
the
implementing
To illustrate, re-consider Alex's case, where the elementary
teachers developed an IEP based on the services they thought were
available at the middle school. Because the middle school
administrators declined to send a representative to the IEP meeting
to ensure its contents would match the resources available at the
middle school, it is reasonable to expect them to either implement
the IEP as written, or consult with Alex's parents to modify the

156

IDEA requires schools provide parents numerous opportunities for

involvement in the IEP process. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (listing
procedural safeguards). However, none of the procedural safeguards require the
school to comply with parents' requests or demands for services as long as the
school offers a FAPE. See supra Part II.A. (describing FAPE standard).
157 See Daniel, supra note 153, at 3-4 for an argument of IDEA's procedural
protections:
[Do] not reconceptualize the connections between parents and school
officials. One reason is that the legislation is largely precatory; educators need take only minimal steps toward governmental ideas about
collaboration with parents. The legislation creates opportunities for
expanding partnerships of parents and teachers, but affords few
consequences if this does not occur. According to researchers, '[a]bsent
clear legislative or constitutional mandate[s], the normal parent-school
relationship is permissive, i.e., schools may respond to [a] parental
request/demand regarding their children's education, but cannot be
required to accommodate the request.' (citation omitted).
158 When a parent takes an active role in IEP development and disputes over the
contents of an IEP arise, this will not result in a failure to implement. In these
cases, the Rowley framework is appropriate. See supra Part II.A (describing
Rowley standard).
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IEP.' 5 9 The middle school teachers should not be free to ignore IEP
provisions they are unwilling or unable to implement.
B. Implementation as a procedural requirement
of IDEA
IDEA's procedural protections are extensive; 160 this led
the Rowley court to emphasize procedure over substance in
establishing a definition of FAPE that defers to schools' judgments
as to what constitutes an appropriate education. 6 1 This procedural
emphasis suggests a stricter standard for IEP implementation than
for measuring the adequacy of IEPs. 162 Implementation is essentially a procedural IDEA requirement. It involves the school
district fulfilling its promise to provide the services agreed upon in
the IEP meeting. As the dissent in Van Duyn noted, allowing the
school to ignore portions of the IEP would "essentially give the
district license to unilaterally redefine the content of the student's
plan by default. Such license undermines the collaborative role of
the IEP team and ignores the parental participation provisions of
the IDEA." 163 Because parents have so little control over the
contents of the IEP, IDEA's procedural protections become
essential, and they would be seriously undermined if a school
could decline to implement IEP provisions.
It is helpful to revisit Alex's case to illustrate. His parents
worried about his transition to the public middle school and
159

See 20 U.S.C. 1414(c)(3)(F) (2006) ("Changes to the IEP may be made either

by the entire IEP Team or, as provided in subparagraph (D), by amending the

IEP rather than by redrafling the entire IEP. Upon request, a parent shall be
provided
with a revised copy of the IEP with the amendments incorporated.").
160

See id. § 1415.
161See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192 (1982) ("The intent of the Act was more to open the door of public

education .... ).

162
See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 828
(9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing low standard in assessing IEP
content does not imply schools have flexibility in implementing IEPs).
163Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii), (e) (2000)).
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considered private school as an alternative. Their concerns were
assuaged when the school offered to include the support of a oneon-one aide in the IEP. Had they known this IEP provision would
not be implemented appropriately, they would not have enrolled
Alex in the public middle school. Alex's case demonstrates that the
procedural protections of IDEA will be of little value if the
school's failure to implement the IEP is excused under the
materiality analysis. 164
C. Limited Remedies
Proponents of a materiality standard are loath to subject
schools to judgments of compensatory education 165 and attorneys'
fees 166 for minor failures to implement IEPs. Indeed, a per se
implementation standard could impose some financial burden on
schools for failures to implement that do not significantly impede a
student from gaining educational benefit from the IEP. However,
remedies under IDEA are limited; hearing officers may grant the
relief they determine to be "appropriate."' 167 Common remedies

164It is unclear whether Alex was denied a FAPE under the Bobby R. or Van

Duyn analyses. Because he has made progress on his goals and objectives, the
school has likely offered him educational services that meet the Rowley "some
benefit" standard. However, placement in a self-contained classroom and denial
of the one-on-one aide could be considered a material failure to implement the
IEP. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18 (comparing Van Duyn and

Bobby R. analyses).
165See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (listing procedures and remedies for
due process claims and civil actions). See also Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging Disparities in Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered
Team Members to Ardent Advocates, 3 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 263, 278 (2008)
(describing remedies for denial of FAPE).
166See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006) (fee shifting provision); see generally
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Attorney Fees for Partially Successful IDEA Claimants,
217 ED. LAW. REP. 769 (2007) (discussing "degree of success" standard to
IDEA litigation).
167 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(e) (2006).
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include IEP revisions, a particular student
placement, and training
68
or hiring of school district personnel. 1
Where a school offers an IEP that is wholly inadequate, a
hearing officer or court may award tuition reimbursement for
placement at a private school. 169 This remedy imposes a significant
burden on the school, particularly when coupled with IDEA's feeshifting provisions. 17 In contrast, tuition reimbursement is not an
appropriate remedy for minor implementation failures;' 7' instead, a
hearing officer will merely order the school to implement the IEP
as written and award compensatory education services to make up
for those lost by the failure to implement. For example, if a
student's IEP called for one hour of speech therapy per week, and
the school failed to offer speech therapy for ten weeks, a hearing
officer may likely order the school to implement the IEP without
delay and provide ten additional hours of speech therapy to
compensate for the lost services.' 72 So, the financial burden
168 See generally Perry Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review
Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 401 (2006).
169 See generally Burlington v. Dep't. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (establishing right to tuition reimbursement after parent's unilateral placement in
private school). A three part test is commonly applied to determine if tuition
reimbursement is appropriate: (1) is the school's proposed placement appropriate; (2) if not, is the parents' unilateral placement appropriate; and (3) if so, what
equitable considerations should be taken into account. See Zirkel, supra note
168, at 412.
170See Damon Huss, BalancingActs: Dispute Resolution in U.S. and English
Special Education Law, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 347, 361-62

(2003) (describing financial impact of special education litigation).
171 Major implementation failures could result in awards of tuition
reimbursement, but these failures would deny FAPE under either the materiality
standard or the per se approach. In some circuits, these implementation failures

could subject schools to § 1983 tort-like damages. See generally Seligman,
supra note 18 (describing availability of § 1983 claims based on IDEA
violations).
172At least one court has applied a student-friendly version of the materiality
standard to a claim of a failure to implement speech therapy provisions of an
IEP. See Catalan v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F. Supp. 2d 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2007)
("[I]n this court's view . . . few, if any, 'provisions'

of an IEP will be
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imposed on schools by a per se approach to implementation cases
is not as overwhelming as it first appears.
Given IDEA's remedy structure, students stand to gain
little by seeking a due process hearing to challenge minor
implementation failures. 173 There is unlikely to be an increase in
74
implementation litigation if courts adopt the per se approach.1
The greatest benefit of imposing the per se standard, as opposed to
the materiality standard or the general Rowley standard, lies in the
clear message it sends to schools. If courts find only material
failures to implement deny FAPE, schools may choose to ignore
provisions of IEPs, and break promises made to parents and
students during IEP meetings. Under the per se standard, however,
it is clear the school must implement all provisions of the IEP.
Alex's case exemplifies the real-world effects of the
different standards. Middle school administrators declined to send
a representative to the elementary school IEP meeting, even though
they would later implement the IEP developed at that meeting. Had
the administrators known they would be called on to provide
services in complete conformity with Alex's IEP, they would have
been more likely to attend the meeting and inform the IEP team of
the middle school's available resources. This would have likely
prevented the IEP team from including provisions middle school
personnel were not prepared to implement. If courts consistently
apply a materiality standard or the traditional Rowley analysis,
however, there is no incentive for the middle school personnel to
participate in the IEP meeting, thereby creating the problem
discussed in the introduction to this article. As Alex's case
insignificant or insubstantial. . . . It is in the contextual, ex post analysis-i.e.,
whether the requirements are feasible and in the best interest of the child as she
progresses that questions of substantiality and significance arise.").
173It is unclear whether full attorneys' fees should be awarded to partially
successful claimants in minor implementation cases. See Mawdsley, supra note
166, at 776 (explaining some courts deny attorney's fees when claimants'
success is only de minimis).
174A per se standard could dissuade implementation litigation due to its clarity.
See Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811, 828 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (arguing materiality standard is vague).
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demonstrates, the implementation standard that courts choose to
adopt may have little impact on special education litigation, but it
will likely influence the routine practices of school administrators
and teachers. Faced with a per se standard, schools will be more
likely to live up to the requirements and purpose of IDEA.
IV.

CONCLUSION

IEP implementation litigation is uncommon. Few courts
have addressed whether IDEA's requirement schools offer a FAPE
"in conformity'' 175 with an IEP means that schools must provide
services in complete conformity, or merely substantial conformity,
with the IEP. Three analyses have been suggested; courts could
apply the traditional Rowley standard to such cases and ask
whether the student gained educational benefit from the IEP as it
was implemented; they could apply a materiality standard and find
substantial implementation failures deny FAPE, but de minimis
failures do not; or they could apply a per se standard and find all
implementation failures deny a FAPE.
This article suggests the per se standard is consistent with
the purpose of IDEA, to ensure that each disabled student gain
meaningful educational benefit from their IEP.1 76 IDEA's
emphasis on procedure seeks to ensure that parents and students
fully participate in the development of IEPs. 177 However, schools
largely control the contents of IEPs, and parents rely on schools to
fulfill promises they make during IEP meetings.' 78 Thus, if courts
decline to adopt the per se standard to analyze implementation
cases, they will undermine the procedural protections that form the
bulk of IDEA. Furthermore, education hearing officers' power to
17'
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(d) (2006).
176See supra Part II.A. (describing meaningful/some benefit standards).
177
See Julie F. Mead & Mark A. Paige, Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson
v. Rowley: An Examination of its PrecedentialImpact, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 329,

341-42 (2008) (describing standards for procedural violations of IDEA).

171
See Wright & Wright, supra note 7, at 42 (describing parents' interests in IEP
development).
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provide "appropriate" relief for denials of FAPE 1 79 lessens the risk
that schools will be unduly burdened by the imposition of a strict
compliance standard. Adopting the per se standard for implementation cases merely reaffirms most teachers' answer to the question, "How much of
an IEP must be implemented?" The answer
80
it."'
of
"all
remains,

179 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006).
180

See Gerl, supra text accompanying

note

119

(describing

common

understanding of special education teachers and administrators that IDEA
requires complete implementation of IEPs).

